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Abstract - This paper reports work of a MEng student final 
year project, which looks in detail at the impacts that distributed 
generation can have on existing low-voltage distribution network 
protection systems. After a review of up-to-date protection 
issues, this paper will investigate several key issues that face 
distributed generation connections when it comes to network 
protection systems. These issues include, the blinding of 
protection systems, failure to automatically reclose, 
unintentional islanding, loss of mains power and the false 
tripping of feeders. Each of these problems impacts on 
protection systems in its own way. This study aims to review and 
investigate these problems via simulation demonstrations on one 
representative network to recommend solutions to practices. 
Index Terms - Low-voltage Distribution Network, 
Distributed Generation, Protection Systems 
I. INTRODUCTION 
To facilitate low carbon operation of the low-voltage 
distribution networks (LVDN), a growing number of power-
electronic converters (PECs) are used to interface 
small/medium scale distributed energy resources (DERs) for 
renewable distributed generation (DG) and smart electricity 
end-use devices, such as wind turbines, photovoltaic (PV) 
panels, energy storages, electric vehicles, intelligently 
controlled appliances. In addition, the system should be 
allowed to operate as separate islands (Microgrids) to reduce 
customer interruption (CI), customer minute loss (CML), and 
implement autonomously controlled strategies. The fact that 
power flows are bi-directional results in a name of “active 
distribution network.” Advantages of active distribution 
networks are seen as incorporating renewable generations, 
reducing transmission network losses and usage to prevent 
network congestions; islanded microgrid operation in case of 
upstream system disturbances. However, disadvantages are 
also seen, one of the major crucial challenges is that the 
existing protection system needs to be adapted. 
II. LOW-VOLTAGE DISTRIBUTION NETWORK PROTECTION 
AND DISTRIBUTED GENERATION 
The conventional LVDN protection system is designed for 
overcurrent operations. All protective devices (from 
secondary substation, e.g. 11kV/0.4kV circuit breakers to 
dominant fuses in 0.4kV LV branches and end-users) are 
coordinated for grid-connected mode of operations, i.e. the 
fault current is expected to be sufficiently large to force the 
fuses to act. This is still required during islanded operation, 
when high fault-currents are only provided from DGs, which 
can be converter interfaced with limited fault-current feeding 
capabilities. As more DGs are being used with or without 
PEC the current protection system needs to be reconsidered to 
act in an island mode or a grid mode. In the island mode the 
DG can operate by itself and can feed into the consumer 
supply assuming the renewable resource (e.g. solar radiation 
or wind) is available to help generate the electricity. In grid 
mode the DG can connect to the grid and is able to feed into 
the grid. Due to these two separate modes, a revised 
protection system needs to be designed as the fault levels for 
islanding mode and grid mode are different. 
 
III. PROTECTION CHALLENGES FROM DISTRIBUTED 
GENERATION CONNECTIONS – PREVIOUS AND CURRENT 
RESEARCH 
Due to inadequate fault currents the coordination may be 
compromised in the islanded mode of operation. Such i.e., 
small fault currents can result in a slow operation of network 
overcurrent devices, unless these devices are made more 
sensitive. However this will have an effect on coordination 
particularly. Therefore, conventional relay and fuse 
coordination and generic overcurrent protection with a single 
setting group may become inadequate. Previous and current 
researches report on the following aspects: 
A. Fault Level Analysis 
Network topology can have an effect on the fault level. It 
also appears that the type of DG and the load ratings can 
cause differing fault levels [1]-[3]. For example paper [1] 
provides an in-depth look at the fault analysis for a sizeable 
grid involving 4 DGs rated at 5MW each and 27 buses. This 
paper gives a good example of how much detail in terms of 
carrying out fault level analysis. 
B. Blinding of Protection Systems/False Tripping of Feeders 
As stated above when a DG is connected to a network it 
can change the fault current value that is seen by the 
protection overcurrent relay. This can prevent the reliable 
tripping of the overcurrent relay in fault conditions. The false 
tripping of feeders is another problem due to the overcurrent 
that is fed by the DG, which is typically caused by 
synchronous generators [4]. In [5] it is suggested that the 
issue of false tripping could be eliminated if a converter based 
DG were to be used in order to limit its fault current. In [6] 
where it suggests the use of an inverter that communicates 
with the overcurrent protection would solve this issue. 
C. Failure to Automatically Reclose 
Auto reclosing is used to clear any temporary faults on the 
system. This only takes roughly 100-200ms, which is 
normally an effective way of clearing the fault. This method 
of clearing faults can fail when used with a DG in the system. 
If the DG’s protection system does not trigger during that 
100-200ms time the auto-recloser takes it means the 
temporary fault is not cleared from the system and becomes 
more permanent. Some papers have suggested changing the 
auto-reclose time to account for the time it would take for the 
DG protection to trigger [7]. 
D. Unintentional Islanding/Loss of Mains Power 
The issue of islanding a section of network with DG has 
been discussed extensively. In [8], several different case 
studies with different conditions are used to analyse 
islanding, especially the unintentional islanding scenario. It 
shows there is a 10% change at the PCC and explains that the 
best way to deal with the unintentional islanding is to use 
PEC-DER. If the unhealthy part of the network is connected 
to some form of DG it is able to still operate [9]. In [6] it 
suggests that there are several designs that could be used to 
solve the problem of islanding and loss of mains. These 
methods are, differential protection schemes [10], a balanced 
combination of different types of DG units for grid 
connection, having different types of inverter working 
together [11]. Each of these techniques seems to have 
potential however only for a particular case. 
 
IV. REPRESENTATIVE NETWORK DEFINITION, 
PSCAD/EMTDC SIMULATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS 
To provide a pathway of studying protection under the 
above scenario more systematically, we employed a 
representative network for simulation and fault analysis as in 
Fig. 1. To incorporate current distribution network 
infrastructure development issues, the network topology 
considered is one feeder in radial configuration up to the 
primary step-up-side of transformer at the common coupling 
point. The system under investigation includes multiple time-
varying distributed generations, e.g. small-scale wind 
turbines, photovoltaic panels. Simulation models of the DGs 
including power conversion systems in Fig. 1 are built with 
fitted parameters to provide typical values for similar 
applications. Network and protection configuration data is 
used in a case study example from literature and an industrial 
project to show both academic and practical perspectives. 
 
 
A. Fault Level Analysis 
Fault level analysis was carried out by applying faults at 
different locations on the system. Three-phase and single-
phase to earth short-circuit fault were applied to each busbar 
and lasted a duration of 0.5 seconds. The fault current values 
shown in the Table I are the peak fault current values and are 
the average of three different results. This was done initially 
to make sure the first reading was not just a bug or a glitch 
producing a false result. Once collecting the data it was found 
that the simulation was reliable and that the same result was 
consistently produced when the test was run these results 
were checked against hand calculations. This data was 
important as it was needed to correctly calibrate the 
protection systems of the network as it gave a good indication 
of what sort of fault current level was to be expected. For 
comparison the normal operating current has also been 
included. 
TABLE I 
FAULT LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTS 
 Fault Current Readings (kA) 
Fault Location Ia Ib Ic Id Ie If Ig 3ph 1ph 3ph 1ph 3ph 1ph 3ph 1ph 3ph 1ph 3ph 1ph 3ph 1ph 
No Fault 0.006 0.12 0.075 0.05 0.007 0.058 0.058 
Bus 1 0.044 0.042 1.2 1.2 1.02 1.23 0.286 0.238 0.16 0.124 0.305 0.17 0.31 0.17 
Bus 2 0.12 0.118 3.3 3.2 1.34 1.77 0.285 0.275 0.14 0.134 0.31 0.2 0.31 0.29 
Bus 3 0.078 0.059 2.1 1.6 0.7 0.81 2.1 2.15 0.15 0.1485 0.27 0.255 0.285 0.345 
Bus 4 0.055 0.0385 1.45 1.05 0.47 0.525 1.34 1.375 0.105 0.095 1.425 1.45 0.31 0.39 
 
These results show that a fault current in one part of the 
network is able to affect different parts of the network not just 
the busbar where the fault has been applied. This is in line 
with the theory and needs to be considered when designing 
any protection system, not just for a distributed generation 
system but for any sort of generation system requiring 
protection. This is because, as previously mentioned when 
setting the protection systems for a network there would 
ideally be layers of protection. This means that there should 
be a backup relay to clear a fault if the primary protection 
system were to fail and not detect the fault and clear it. In 
order to calibrate this protection effectively the impacts of a 
fault in part of the grid and how it affects the rest of the grid 
needs to be known. If this is not know the backup protection 
could not be effectively set up and a fault current in one 
location could potentially trip the protection systems in 
 
Fig. 1.  Schematic of the simulated representative LV distribution network 
(one feeder). 
another part of the system which could cause unnecessary 
loss of power in another part of the network. These readings 
are dependent on what sort of distributed generation is 
connected to the network, if a new generator were to be 
connected to the network then another fault test like this 
would have to be done as the initial results would not be 
valid. 
B. Coordination of Protection Systems 
Current observations show that the issues could be solved 
if all protective devices are automated circuit breaker with 
modern microprocessor relays, also known as intelligent 
electronic devices (IEDs), based on advanced communication 
system. This will be the assumption for the coordination of 
protective devices in this section. 
Fig.2 shows the test set up for the relay coordination tests. 
When a fault is applied at its current location the protection 
systems at location A should activate and open, this 
protection system should provide the quickest reaction time 
as it is closest to the fault. Once the protection at location A is 
confirmed to work it will be taken out of the system to 
simulate that protection failing. If the protection here fails the 
protection at point B should activate and should clear the 
fault. The protection here will take longer to react as it is 
further away from the fault location. Once this is confirmed 
to work the protection at points A and B will be removed to 
simulate both sets of protection systems failing. The fault will 
then be applied and if set up correctly the protection systems 
at point C should activate and clear the fault, this response 
will be slower than that of the protection systems at point A 
and B. If the protection systems pass this test then they will 




When tested each of the breaker systems at positions A, B 
and C were able to detect the fault and activate as shown in 
Figs. 3-5. This meant they were able to open and clear the 
fault when the initial protection had failed to operate. The 
initial fault was applied at 6 seconds into the simulation and 
had a duration of 0.5 seconds. At location A the fault current 
is applied at 6 seconds, the protection systems at location A 
take 0.017 seconds to activate and clear the fault. For this test 
the protection systems were disabled at location A to see how 
long it would take for the protection systems at B to activate 
or if they would activate at all. In this test the protection did 
active 0.044 seconds after the fault was applied to the 
network. Here is the test result for the protection system at 
location C. For this test the other protection systems were 
disabled to see if the protection systems here would trigger 
when all other protection systems had failed. The results 
show that they do activate and take 0.144 seconds to activate. 
 
 
C. Failure to Auto-reclose 
As stated in Section II, auto-reclose becomes an issue when 
the circuit breaker trips and then closes before the fault has 
been cleared causing an arc. In order to simulate this, a fault 
was applied for 0.5 seconds. The inverse time relays were 
then replaced with timed logic blocks so that the circuit 
breaker opening and closing could take place at a user defined 
time. Using these timed logic blocks the circuit breaker was 
to open at 10 seconds when the fault is first detected. The 
breakers were to then close at 10.3 seconds. This time of 
operation is in line with typical open and close times of a 
breaker [7]. As the breaker shut before the fault was over this 
will give the effect that there was arcing when and the fault 
shall not be cleared entirely from the network. 
Fig. 6 shows the waveform recorded from this experiment. 
It can be seen that the fault is initially applied at 10 seconds. 
The circuit breakers impact on the waveform can be seen as 
they are open until 10.3 seconds. The fault then continues as 
it has not been cleared as seen by the ripples in the current 
waveform after 10.5 seconds. 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Fault current at location A. 
 
 
Fig. 4.  Fault current at location B. 
 
Fig. 5.  Fault current at location C. 
 
Fig. 2.  Relay configuration and coordination test system. 
  
The results for the failure to auto-reclose experiment are in 
line with the theory stated in the relevant background section 
in this report. It can be seen in the results that the fault is 
never cleared from the system and it lasts for the remaining 
duration of the simulation providing a less than ideal current 
supply. As this fault current had not been cleared it would 
have caused damage to other parts of the network due to the 
high current. 
This issue is particularly problematic as the breaker is 
functioning correctly to try and clear the fault. The issue is 
with the time that the breaker is open for. There are several 
solutions to the problem, which are backed by previous 
research. The first solution would be to increase the reclose 
time [12, 13]. There are several issues with this, from a power 
supply point of view a reclose time of roughly 0.3 seconds 
has little effect of the quality of the power supplied. A reclose 
time of much higher, 1 second for example would be able to 
stop arcing and the fault would be cleared. This increase in 
time would impact the quality of the power supply seen by 
the customer so if there were not too many distributed 
generators connected to a network increasing the reclose time 
may not have too much of an impact. If there were a higher 
penetration of distributed generation connected to a network 
then the 1 second dead time that would be caused by the 
breaker opening and closing would become much more 
noticeable. Another potential solution to this problem is to 
have close synchronisation between the distributed generator 
and the protection at the fault location. If the protection 
system at the fault location were able to communicate with 
the protection systems on the distributed generator then the 
protection systems at the generator could be triggered. This 
would stop the distributed generators connected to the system 
feeding the fault, creating the arc. This solution would not be 
straight forward to implement in PSCAD as different modules 
would have to be created to simulate the communications 
between the different protection systems. 
D. Unintentional Islanding 
In order to simulate unintentional islanding realistically the 
variable speed wind turbine was to become disconnected 
from the rest of the network under fault conditions. In this 
case a fault is applied to bus 4. This causes the protection 
systems for bus 4 to activate essentially islanding the variable 
speed wind turbine while it is still powering a load. In theory 
once the disconnection has happened the wind turbine should 
continue to provide power to the load, it will be a lower 
power than when it was connected to the rest of the system 
however. After the breaker had tripped and stayed open the 
voltage and current levels being fed to the load could be 
monitored, the impact this disconnection had on the rest of 
the network was also monitored. According to theory along 
with what was stated in the background section, when the 
fault occurs the protection should activate and should 
consequently cut off the variable speed wind turbine from the 
rest of the system. When this separation happens there should 
be a decrease in the current provided to the load. 
The results in Fig. 7 show that the system has reacted in 
line with what the theory suggests. The system is providing 
the required amount of current to the load up until 8 seconds. 
At 8 seconds a fault is applied which triggers the circuit 
breakers, disconnecting the wind turbine from the rest of the 
system shown by the drop in current. Then the wind turbine 
begins to provide power to the load when not connected to 
the grid and the load current gradually reduces due to the 




E. Loss of Mains Power 
This problem was simulated using a three-phase circuit 
breaker and a timed circuit breaker logic block. To simulate 
this fault a three phase breaker was placed at the bottom of a 
feeder that had a the 11kV grid input on it, using the timed 
logic block this breaker could be programed to open and stay 
open at a specific time. This effectively simulated the grid 
system being cut off from the rest of the network. The 
impacts of this were then monitored so the changes in the 
current and voltage levels around the grid system could be 
analysed. At 6 seconds into the simulation program the timer 
triggers the breaker to open and stay open. Once the mains 
have been disconnected a fault was then applied at Bus2 
above at 10 seconds into to the simulation. The impact of the 
loss of mains on the fault protection could then be observed. 
When the mains are disconnected from the rest of the 
network it is expected that there will be a drop in the current 
provided due to the gird disconnected. When this has 
happened it is expected to render the current protection 
systems set up for the grid connection to be ineffective and 
unable to detect a fault current. The loss of mains test results 
are shown below in Figs. 8-10. 
Fig. 8 shows an overview of the loss of mains test that was 
carried out. The grid supply was disconnected from the 
system at 6 seconds. There was then a three-phase fault 
applied to the system at 10 seconds. Figs. 9 and 10 show the 
key parts of the wave form in Fig. 8 in more detail. This 
change in current meant that the circuit breaker in place to 
 
Fig. 7.  Simulation results of unintentional islanding. 
 
Fig. 6.  Simulation results of failure to auto-reclose. 
detect a fault here was not triggered so the fault remained in 
the network. 
 
Normally if a fault were to be applied in the same location 
without the grid input being disconnected the circuit breaker 
would have been triggered, it would have opened and the 
fault would have been cleared. In this case though as the grid 
input has disconnected the operating current under normal 
conditions has dropped. As the normal operation current has 
dropped the fault current has also dropped. In this test the 
fault current after the mains had been disconnected was not 
detected by the circuit breaker protection system in the 
circuit. This meant that the fault current caused at 10 seconds 
was not cleared from the system and was free to impact other 
parts of the system. This test showed the once the mains is 
disconnected a new protection scheme would be needed as 
none of the protection schemes used in the network were able 
to detect the fault current and clear it. In a real system this 
fault current could potentially impact and damage other parts 
of the system. The current protection schemes implemented 
in this grid system are inadequate for this fault condition 
which suggests a redesign would be required perhaps using 
different technology or fault detecting techniques. Due to the 
difference in magnitudes between the two different fault 
currents the protection system could either be set to deal with 
the grid connected fault currents or the loss of mains fault 
currents not both. If the protection systems were set up to deal 
with the loss of mains fault currents then they would 
constantly be tripping during normal operation connected to 
the grid. 
A potential solution to this problem could be smart relays 
or relay to relay communication [14]. These are relays that 
are able to communicate with other relays and ideally the rest 
of the grid system. If a signal were to be sent to the rest of the 
protection systems on the network when the mains is lost. 
Assuming they have the functionality the relays, could set 
themselves to different parameters. Ideally if the mains of a 
grid system were to be disconnected there should be a way of 
notifying the relay so its protection settings can change and 
adjust for the loss of mains fault levels. This would mean that 
the relay would essentially have two different fault levels. 
One for the grid connected system which typically has higher 
fault currents and then one for the system without a grid 
connection that typically has lower fault currents. This would 
make for a much more versatile and adaptive protection 
system as it would be able to have a number of settings that 
would be able to handle a number of different scenarios. 
Another solution could be to use rate of change of 
frequency protection (ROCOF). This is a protection system 
that monitors the change of the frequency of the system. For 
loss of mains this form of protection would work as the mains 
connection is used to synchronise the rest of the systems. 
When the mains is disconnected the frequency of the system 
drifts from what it was. The ROCOF protection would detect 
this change in frequency and would then trigger, this would 
limit the impact that the loss of mains situation would have 
on a system. 
F. Blinding of Protection 
This is to test how the connection of distributed generators 
could affect the fault current experienced by the load. All of 
the distributed generators were disconnected leaving just the 
grid input connected. A three-phase to-ground fault was then 
applied to the bus bar the load was connected to. Different 
generators were connected and disconnected to see what 
impact different distances had with regards to altering fault 
current levels. The results in the below show the data 
collected for the blinding of protection test. The results are 
expected to show that when a distributed generator is 
connected to the grid it has an impact of the fault current seen 
by the network. 
Fig. 11 shows the results for the blinding of protection test. 
For this test a three-phase fault was applied at a given time 
and lasted for 0.5 seconds. The fault was applied at 7 seconds 
to the busbar that was connected to the load. The initial 
results had to be processed, when acquiring the results the 
current for each phase is recorded at time increments of 50 
micro-seconds (µs). In order to get readable results from this 
test each period of the waveform was sampled to find the 
peak value for that period. This value is what is plotted on the 
graph and represents the peak value for the fault current 
experienced. Due to the high resolution of the data capture 
used in the software some data processing techniques were 
needed to sample the peak parts of the fault current. 
 
 
Fig. 8.  Overview of the loss of mains results. 
 
 
Fig. 9.  Disconnection of mains. 
 
 
Fig. 10.  Results of three-phase fault applied. 
 The results show that the topology of the network does 
affect how much of an impact the distributed generators can 
have when connected to the network. The generator closest to 
the load, the fixed speed wind turbine seems to have the 
biggest effect on the fault level seen by the load when it is 
connected. As the rest of the generators are further away from 
the fault location they have less of an impact on the fault 
level. This can be seen in Fig. 11 where the connection of the 
fixed speed wind turbine noticeably affects the fault current 
level, when this is disconnected and another generator is 
connected the difference is not as great. This difference as 
previously stated is due to the difference in distance between 
the generation points and the fault location. In order to 
suggest an optimal solution further research would need to be 
done to fully evaluate the extent of this problem. One solution 
to the problem although not ideal would be a complete 
overhaul of the systems protection systems when a new form 
of generation is added to the system. This is not ideal as it 
would require a lot of man hours and could be difficult to 
implement. This solution would however solve the problem 
as the new generator would no longer be added on to the 
existing protection system but would have its own protection 
system. 
The topology of each different system needs to be assessed 
individually with regards to the blinding of protection. As 
each different topology of a system will have different 
impacts on the fault currents seen by the load. This means 
there is no quick fix to this problem as each different system 
is unique. A solution as previously would be to reconsider the 
design of the network protection trip levels when a new 
distributed generator is connected to a system. This problem 
would require further investigation to provide a more firm 
solution. Currently however with the data gained from this 
experiment it can be seen that each different topology has its 
own impact on the fault current seen by the load on the 
system. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper presents review and discussions with simulation 
results on potential impacts of distributed generation can have 
on LVDN protection systems. A suitable and effective 
solution for each of the situations tested for in this study 
needs to be developed. This will require further study to 
develop a much smarter and adaptive protection system as 
there is no one blanket solution to each of the problems. This 
report has provided speculation on potential solutions but 
further investigation would be required to effectively 
implement and test these solutions to evaluate their merits. It 
should also be noted that, for LVDN, distribution 
management system (DMS) is in its infancy and expensive 
since current LVDN do not have enough instrumentation for 
full observation of the system. To avoid the reliance on 
communication systems, research need to be done based on 
limited number of intelligent electronic devices (IEDs), based 
on advanced communication infrastructure. It is also essential 
to ensure that settings chosen for protection relays take into 
account the flexibility of grid topology and changes in 
location, type and amount of generation; otherwise the 
purpose of microgrid operation is compromised. 
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Fig. 11.  Simulation results of the blinding of protection. 
